28 ideas
13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames] |
17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames] |
17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames] |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
13965 | Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames] |
13964 | Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames] |
13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames] |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |