209 ideas
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
| 21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
| 15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
| 15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
| 15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
| 14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
| 15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
| 15130 | If a property is possible, there is something which can have it [Williamson] |
| 15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
| 21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
| 21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
| 21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
| 17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
| 10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
| 4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
| 7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
| 18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
| 15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
| 21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
| 9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
| 8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
| 9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
| 9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
| 9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
| 9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
| 9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
| 9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
| 9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
| 9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
| 9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
| 8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
| 5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
| 9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
| 9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
| 9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
| 9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
| 9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
| 12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
| 5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
| 9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
| 17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
| 17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
| 21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
| 21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
| 21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
| 21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
| 21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
| 9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
| 21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
| 21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
| 21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
| 21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
| 21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
| 21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
| 21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
| 21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
| 21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
| 21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
| 9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
| 11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
| 21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
| 14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
| 12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
| 22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
| 14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
| 14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
| 14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
| 18925 | If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron] |
| 21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
| 4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 3583 | External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
| 9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
| 16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
| 16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
| 16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 3537 | I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill] |
| 14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
| 9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
| 9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
| 9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
| 18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 3772 | The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill] |
| 7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
| 3769 | With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill] |
| 3767 | Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill] |
| 7076 | Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley] |
| 3771 | Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill] |
| 3768 | Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill] |
| 3776 | Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill] |
| 7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
| 7202 | The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill] |
| 5935 | Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill] |
| 3764 | Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill] |
| 3763 | Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill] |
| 3765 | Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill] |
| 3766 | Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill] |
| 3770 | General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill] |
| 6697 | Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill] |
| 7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
| 3773 | No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill] |
| 3774 | Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill] |
| 7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
| 7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
| 7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
| 20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
| 20508 | How people vote should be on public record, so they can be held accountable [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20507 | Voting is a strict duty, like jury service, and must only be aimed at the public good [Mill] |
| 20505 | Direct democracy is inexperience judging experience, and ignorance judging knowledge [Mill] |
| 20504 | People can only participate in decisions in small communities, so representatives are needed [Mill] |
| 7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
| 7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
| 7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
| 7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
| 20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
| 7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
| 7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
| 7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
| 7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
| 7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
| 3775 | A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill] |
| 7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
| 7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
| 7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
| 7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
| 8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
| 10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
| 14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
| 8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
| 14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
| 4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |
| 15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |
| 21332 | We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic [Mill] |
| 7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |
| 21333 | Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil [Mill] |
| 21335 | Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust [Mill] |
| 21334 | No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery [Mill] |
| 21329 | Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice [Mill] |
| 21328 | Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures [Mill] |
| 21330 | Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother [Mill] |
| 21331 | Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death [Mill] |