164 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
22752 | Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus] |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
16259 | Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
22744 | Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
22748 | Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect [Sext.Empiricus] |
1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
20795 | Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
20794 | How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus] |
1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
22746 | If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length [Sext.Empiricus] |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
22741 | The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus] |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
22754 | Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
22755 | Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus] |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
22756 | If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus] |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
22747 | A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place [Sext.Empiricus] |
1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
22749 | Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true [Sext.Empiricus] |
16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |
22750 | Time is divisible, into past, present and future [Sext.Empiricus] |
1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
22742 | Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus] |
22751 | If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
22730 | All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good [Sext.Empiricus] |
22739 | God must suffer to understand suffering [Sext.Empiricus] |
1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
22738 | The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed [Sext.Empiricus] |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
22734 | God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations [Sext.Empiricus] |
1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
22736 | God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God [Sext.Empiricus] |
22740 | God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God [Sext.Empiricus] |
22735 | The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause [Sext.Empiricus] |
22732 | The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind [Sext.Empiricus] |
22728 | Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions [Sext.Empiricus] |
22737 | An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God [Sext.Empiricus] |
22731 | It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods [Sext.Empiricus] |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |
1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |