257 ideas
| 9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
| 20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 7396 | Hobbes created English-language philosophy [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
| 17240 | Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes] |
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 6211 | Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes] |
| 8014 | Resolve a complex into simple elements, then reconstruct the complex by using them [Hobbes, by MacIntyre] |
| 9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
| 17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
| 17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
| 17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
| 21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
| 21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
| 15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
| 15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
| 15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
| 21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| 20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
| 20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
| 15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
| 15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
| 15130 | If a property is possible, there is something which can have it [Williamson] |
| 15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
| 21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 17245 | A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
| 8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
| 21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
| 6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| 21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
| 18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
| 15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
| 21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
| 17258 | If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes] |
| 9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
| 16789 | Only supernatural means could annihilate anything once it had being [Hobbes] |
| 5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
| 17253 | Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 7559 | Every part of the universe is body, and non-body is not part of it [Hobbes] |
| 15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
| 21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| 21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
| 21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
| 21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
| 21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
| 21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
| 21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
| 9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
| 21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
| 21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
| 21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
| 21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
| 21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
| 21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
| 21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
| 21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
| 21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
| 21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
| 16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
| 16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
| 16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
| 21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
| 17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
| 14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
| 17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
| 17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
| 17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
| 16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
| 21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 16620 | A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes] |
| 16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
| 17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
| 17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
| 17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
| 17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
| 16622 | Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes] |
| 16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
| 21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
| 17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
| 12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
| 17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
| 16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
| 17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
| 14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
| 6215 | 'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes] |
| 14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
| 14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
| 14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
| 15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
| 18925 | If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron] |
| 21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
| 4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
| 19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 16638 | The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes] |
| 2356 | Appearance and reality can be separated by mirrors and echoes [Hobbes] |
| 7405 | Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes] |
| 16688 | Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
| 2357 | Dreams must be false because they seem absurd, but dreams don't see waking as absurd [Hobbes] |
| 17238 | Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes] |
| 1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
| 14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
| 20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
| 20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 6213 | A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes] |
| 2384 | Those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary [Hobbes] |
| 2358 | Freedom is absence of opposition to action; the idea of 'free will' is absurd [Hobbes] |
| 2385 | If a man suddenly develops an intention of doing something, the cause is out of his control, not in his will [Hobbes] |
| 20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
| 20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| 20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
| 21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
| 6214 | Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity [Hobbes] |
| 5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 6208 | Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes] |
| 2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 23987 | The 'simple passions' are appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief [Hobbes, by Goldie] |
| 17261 | Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes] |
| 17236 | Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes] |
| 21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
| 18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 2362 | The will is just the last appetite before action [Hobbes] |
| 7408 | It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 2363 | Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes] |
| 20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
| 3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 7407 | Good and evil are what please us; goodness and badness the powers causing them [Hobbes] |
| 20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
| 20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
| 2360 | 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes] |
| 3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 7410 | Self-preservation is basic, and people judge differently about that, implying ethical relativism [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 2368 | Men's natural desires are no sin, and neither are their actions, until law makes it so [Hobbes] |
| 20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
| 20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
| 6209 | There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes] |
| 2359 | Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes] |
| 2370 | All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes] |
| 7409 | Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 6210 | Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes] |
| 20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 8015 | Hobbes wants a contract to found morality, but shared values are needed to make a contract [MacIntyre on Hobbes] |
| 2371 | A contract is a mutual transfer of rights [Hobbes] |
| 2372 | The person who performs first in a contract is said to 'merit' the return, and is owed it [Hobbes] |
| 5337 | For Hobbes the Golden Rule concerns not doing things, whereas Jesus encourages active love [Hobbes, by Flanagan] |
| 2374 | In the violent state of nature, the merest suspicion is enough to justify breaking a contract [Hobbes] |
| 8016 | Fear of sanctions is the only motive for acceptance of authority that Hobbes can think of [MacIntyre on Hobbes] |
| 2375 | Suspicion will not destroy a contract, if there is a common power to enforce it [Hobbes] |
| 2377 | No one who admitted to not keeping contracts could ever be accepted as a citizen [Hobbes] |
| 2379 | If there is a good reason for breaking a contract, the same reason should have stopped the making of it [Hobbes] |
| 2373 | The first performer in a contract is handing himself over to an enemy [Hobbes] |
| 2382 | Someone who keeps all his contracts when others are breaking them is making himself a prey to others [Hobbes] |
| 5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
| 20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 2383 | Virtues are a means to peaceful, sociable and comfortable living [Hobbes] |
| 2376 | Injustice is the failure to keep a contract, and justice is the constant will to give what is owed [Hobbes] |
| 2367 | In time of war the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short [Hobbes] |
| 20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 19764 | Hobbes attributed to savages the passions which arise in a law-bound society [Hobbes, by Rousseau] |
| 20566 | Hobbes says the people voluntarily give up their sovereignty, in a contract with a ruler [Hobbes, by Oksala] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 2366 | There is not enough difference between people for one to claim more benefit than another [Hobbes] |
| 20485 | Hobbes says people are roughly equal; Locke says there is no right to impose inequality [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
| 2369 | If we seek peace and defend ourselves, we must compromise on our rights [Hobbes] |
| 20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20484 | We should obey the laws of nature, provided other people are also obeying them [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
| 7573 | The legal positivism of Hobbes said law is just formal or procedural [Hobbes, by Jolley] |
| 2380 | Punishment should only be for reform or deterrence [Hobbes] |
| 23609 | I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes] |
| 2361 | If fear of unknown powers is legal it is religion, if it is illegal it is superstition [Hobbes] |
| 6212 | Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes] |
| 1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
| 16600 | Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes] |
| 21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
| 20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
| 5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 17252 | Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes] |
| 17254 | An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes] |
| 2364 | Causation is only observation of similar events following each other, with nothing visible in between [Hobbes] |
| 17235 | A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes] |
| 17234 | Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes] |
| 17259 | 'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes] |
| 20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 17243 | Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes] |
| 20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
| 3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
| 3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
| 15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |
| 7411 | The attributes of God just show our inability to conceive his nature [Hobbes] |
| 1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 2365 | Religion is built on ignorance and misinterpretation of what is unknown or frightening [Hobbes] |
| 2378 | Belief in an afterlife is based on poorly founded gossip [Hobbes] |
| 20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
| 21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |