249 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |
5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |