216 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
14799 | Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce] |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
14781 | A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
7634 | Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund] |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |