Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cardinal/Hayward/Jones, Rod Girle and Diodorus Cronus

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
7786 Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle]
7798 There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
7799 Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
7797 Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
7794 There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
7793 ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle]
7795 S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
7787 Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle]
7788 Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle]
7796 Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
7789 Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
7790 If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
7800 Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
5998 From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
20832 The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus]
7801 Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14304 Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
7792 A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6024 Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]