13 ideas
22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |