Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh, Stephen S. Colvin and John Bacon

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
20728 Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
18405 A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
20726 We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
20727 Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
20729 Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
20730 If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
20731 The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10467 Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John]
10464 A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John]
10465 Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
10466 Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
18422 Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
18425 We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
18421 Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
18419 Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18404 It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
18426 All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
18427 If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
18428 You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
18429 Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
18407 Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
18413 Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
18417 Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
18408 Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
18414 Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
18423 All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
18406 The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
18411 It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
18420 We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]