52 ideas
12104 | All ideas must be understood historically [Comte] |
12105 | Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte] |
9786 | Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R] |
12112 | Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte] |
12106 | Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte] |
7491 | The phases of human thought are theological, then metaphysical, then positivist [Comte, by Watson] |
12111 | Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte] |
12114 | Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte] |
12116 | Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte] |
9784 | A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R] |
18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
13941 | Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R] |
13942 | Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R] |
9783 | While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R] |
14961 | Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R] |
14962 | Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R] |
13952 | Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R] |
13954 | The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R] |
13955 | Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R] |
13953 | An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R] |
13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R] |
12108 | All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte] |
12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
12107 | Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte] |
18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
12115 | Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte] |
18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
13950 | People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R] |
13948 | For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R] |
18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
13944 | We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R] |
13947 | 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R] |
13943 | We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R] |
13946 | To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R] |
13951 | Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R] |
18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
12113 | The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte] |
12110 | We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte] |