Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh, G.E.M. Anscombe and Richard T.W. Arthur

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32 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe]
Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]