Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Buddhaghosa, Richard M. Hare and Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G

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27 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
13451 The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
13452 Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
13449 We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
13450 Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13453 Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16050 The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
13448 The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2855 In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
22331 Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
22484 Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
4125 Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
4126 If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
4127 If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
22483 A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
4360 By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6449 The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
7907 Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa]