Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Bonaventura, H. Paul Grice and Robert Boyle

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
I don't see how mere moving matter can lead to the bodies of men and animals, and especially their seeds [Boyle]