20 ideas
| 17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
| 17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
| 19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
| 19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
| 19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
| 19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
| 19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
| 19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
| 19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
| 19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
| 19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
| 19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
| 17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
| 17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 16643 | Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura] |
| 16696 | Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura] |