46 ideas
| 8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
| 8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
| 13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
| 16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
| 8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
| 8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
| 8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
| 8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
| 8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
| 15035 | If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio] |
| 8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
| 8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
| 14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
| 13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
| 13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |
| 13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
| 13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
| 4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
| 23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
| 13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
| 13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
| 5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
| 5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
| 5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
| 5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
| 8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
| 5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
| 5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
| 5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
| 5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
| 5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
| 5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
| 5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
| 8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
| 8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
| 5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
| 5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
| 5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
| 5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
| 5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
| 5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
| 5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
| 5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |