54 ideas
| 4986 | A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R] |
| 16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
| 23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
| 23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 15035 | If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio] |
| 14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
| 23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
| 5001 | Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R] |
| 4993 | If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R] |
| 5000 | Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R] |
| 5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
| 5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
| 5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
| 5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
| 4982 | Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R] |
| 4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
| 4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
| 4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
| 4990 | The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R] |
| 4984 | All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R] |
| 4998 | Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R] |
| 4985 | If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R] |
| 4997 | It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R] |
| 4999 | For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R] |
| 4995 | Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R] |
| 5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
| 5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
| 5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
| 5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
| 5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
| 5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
| 5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
| 23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
| 5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
| 5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
| 5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
| 5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
| 5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
| 5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
| 5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
| 5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |