102 ideas
| 23027 | Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 18019 | People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor] |
| 17998 | Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor] |
| 18012 | Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor] |
| 18013 | Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor] |
| 18011 | Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor] |
| 18016 | Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor] |
| 18015 | The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor] |
| 18017 | If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor] |
| 18021 | Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor] |
| 18030 | A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor] |
| 18031 | If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor] |
| 18032 | Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor] |
| 18034 | Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor] |
| 18037 | Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor] |
| 18039 | If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor] |
| 18041 | Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor] |
| 18055 | In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor] |
| 18056 | Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor] |
| 18057 | 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor] |
| 18058 | Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor] |
| 18059 | The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor] |
| 23030 | Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 18040 | Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor] |
| 17997 | Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor] |
| 16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
| 15035 | If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio] |
| 14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
| 18060 | We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor] |
| 23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
| 23044 | All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23034 | The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23029 | Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
| 5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
| 5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
| 5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
| 18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |
| 18035 | Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor] |
| 18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
| 18008 | Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor] |
| 18010 | 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor] |
| 18053 | The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor] |
| 17999 | Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor] |
| 18000 | Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor] |
| 18014 | Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor] |
| 18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |
| 18036 | A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor] |
| 18051 | In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor] |
| 18043 | The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor] |
| 18042 | The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor] |
| 18047 | A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor] |
| 18048 | A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor] |
| 18049 | The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor] |
| 18050 | If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor] |
| 18054 | Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor] |
| 18028 | Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor] |
| 18029 | Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor] |
| 18022 | Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor] |
| 18024 | One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor] |
| 18023 | Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor] |
| 18025 | The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor] |
| 18026 | Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor] |
| 18027 | Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor] |
| 5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
| 5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
| 23035 | The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH] |
| 5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
| 23032 | What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
| 23033 | Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
| 5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
| 23046 | States only have full authority if they heed the claims of human fellowship [Green,TH] |
| 23045 | Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH] |
| 23050 | The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH] |
| 23052 | Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH] |
| 23036 | The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23039 | A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23037 | People are improved by egalitarian institutions and habits [Green,TH] |
| 23051 | Equality also implies liberty, because equality must be of opportunity as well as possessions [Green,TH] |
| 23043 | All talk of the progress of a nation must reduce to the progress of its individual members [Green,TH] |
| 23038 | People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23028 | The highest political efforts express our deeper social spirit [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23054 | Communism is wrong because it restricts the freedom of individuals to contribute to the community [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23047 | Original common ownership is securing private property, not denying it [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23042 | National spirit only exists in the individuals who embody it [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
| 23048 | The ground of property ownership is not force but the power to use it for social ends [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23049 | Property is needed by all citizens, to empower them to achieve social goods [Green,TH] |
| 23040 | If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH] |
| 23031 | God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH] |
| 16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
| 5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
| 5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
| 5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
| 5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
| 5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
| 23041 | God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH] |
| 5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
| 5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
| 5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |