Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Boethius, Michel Foucault and David Kaplan

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68 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Early Greeks cared about city and companions; later Greeks concentrated on the self [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
The big issue since the eighteenth century has been: what is Reason? Its effect, limits and dangers? [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism systematically abstracted the event from sciences, and even from history [Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Foucault originally felt that liberating reason had become an instrument of domination [Foucault, by Gutting]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the procedures for controlling which statements are acceptable [Foucault]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth doesn't arise from solitary freedom, but from societies with constraints [Foucault]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Why does knowledge appear in sudden bursts, and not in a smooth continuous development? [Foucault]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Foucault challenges knowledge in psychology and sociology, not in the basic sciences [Foucault, by Gutting]
Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius]
God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
The author function of any text is a plurality of selves [Foucault, by Gutting]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Why couldn't a person's life become a work of art? [Foucault]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Greeks and early Christians were much more concerned about food than about sex [Foucault]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Nature is not the basis of rights, but the willingness to risk death in asserting them [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Every society has a politics of truth, concerning its values, functions, prestige and mechanisms [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Marxists denounced power as class domination, but never analysed its mechanics [Foucault]
Power doesn't just repress, but entices us with pleasure, artefacts, knowledge and discourse [Foucault]
Foucault can't accept that power is sometimes decent and benign [Foucault, by Scruton]
The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
The big question of the Renaissance was how to govern everything, from the state to children [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting]
The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Power is used to create identities and ways of life for other people [Foucault, by Shorten]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History lacks 'meaning', but it can be analysed in terms of its struggles [Foucault]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius]
God is the good [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius]
If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius]