Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Boethius, Martha Nussbaum and Amie L. Thomasson

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67 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius]
God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
The Aristotelian idea that choices can be perceived needs literary texts to expound it [Nussbaum]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Philosophers after Aristotle endorsed the medical analogy for eudaimonia [Nussbaum, by Flanagan]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum]
Liberals must respect family freedom - but families are the great oppressors of women [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG]
Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum]
Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum]
Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum]
It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum]
The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius]
God is the good [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius]
If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius]