51 ideas
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
15035 | If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |