209 ideas
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
15035 | If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio] |
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14288 | 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13769 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington] |
13858 | The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14289 | There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson] |
4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson] |
4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |