Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Arcesilaus, Irving M. Copi and Anand Vaidya

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
A false object might give the same presentation as a true one [Arcesilaus, by Cicero]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]