16 ideas
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
2667 | A false object might give the same presentation as a true one [Arcesilaus, by Cicero] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |