Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Antiphon, Richard Cartwright and Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
9786 Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
9784 A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
14961 Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
14962 Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13952 Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13954 The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13955 Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
536 We should follow the law in public, and nature in private [Antiphon]
1557 To gain the greatest advantage only treat law as important when other people are present [Antiphon]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
540 The way you spend your time will form your character [Antiphon]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
539 Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy [Antiphon]