68 ideas
| 22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
| 22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| 10702 | Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter] |
| 10713 | Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter] |
| 13044 | Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter] |
| 10708 | Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter] |
| 13546 | The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter] |
| 10707 | Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 10704 | We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter] |
| 22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
| 22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 10703 | Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter] |
| 22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
| 9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
| 8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
| 10712 | If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter] |
| 17882 | It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| 22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
| 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
| 22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
| 8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
| 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
| 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
| 22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
| 19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
| 19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
| 19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
| 8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| 13043 | A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter] |
| 22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
| 8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
| 13042 | If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter] |
| 14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 13041 | Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter] |
| 10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
| 22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
| 22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
| 10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
| 22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
| 22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
| 8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |
| 536 | We should follow the law in public, and nature in private [Antiphon] |
| 1557 | To gain the greatest advantage only treat law as important when other people are present [Antiphon] |
| 540 | The way you spend your time will form your character [Antiphon] |
| 539 | Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy [Antiphon] |