Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anselm, Robert Merrihew Adams and Henry Laycock

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33 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God [Anselm, by Engel]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]