102 ideas
| 23027 | Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
| 6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
| 6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
| 6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
| 6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
| 6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
| 23030 | Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
| 6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
| 6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
| 6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
| 6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
| 6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
| 2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
| 6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
| 6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
| 6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
| 6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
| 6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
| 6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
| 6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| 6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
| 6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
| 18892 | Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn] |
| 12019 | McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn] |
| 6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
| 6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
| 6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
| 6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
| 6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
| 6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
| 6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
| 6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
| 6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
| 6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
| 6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
| 6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
| 6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
| 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
| 6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
| 23044 | All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
| 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
| 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
| 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
| 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
| 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
| 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
| 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
| 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
| 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
| 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
| 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
| 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
| 6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
| 23034 | The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23029 | Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
| 4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
| 2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
| 2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
| 2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
| 7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
| 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
| 3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
| 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
| 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
| 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
| 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
| 4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
| 6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
| 2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
| 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
| 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
| 23035 | The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH] |
| 23032 | What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23033 | Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23046 | States only have full authority if they heed the claims of human fellowship [Green,TH] |
| 23045 | Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH] |
| 23050 | The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH] |
| 23052 | Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH] |
| 23036 | The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23039 | A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23037 | People are improved by egalitarian institutions and habits [Green,TH] |
| 23051 | Equality also implies liberty, because equality must be of opportunity as well as possessions [Green,TH] |
| 23043 | All talk of the progress of a nation must reduce to the progress of its individual members [Green,TH] |
| 23038 | People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23028 | The highest political efforts express our deeper social spirit [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23054 | Communism is wrong because it restricts the freedom of individuals to contribute to the community [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23047 | Original common ownership is securing private property, not denying it [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23042 | National spirit only exists in the individuals who embody it [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23048 | The ground of property ownership is not force but the power to use it for social ends [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23049 | Property is needed by all citizens, to empower them to achieve social goods [Green,TH] |
| 23040 | If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH] |
| 1497 | For Anaximenes nature is air, which takes different forms by rarefaction and condensation [Anaximenes, by Simplicius] |
| 2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
| 23031 | God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH] |
| 6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
| 6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |
| 23041 | God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH] |