60 ideas
| 5988 | Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár] |
| 1496 | The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle] |
| 14273 | Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington] |
| 22886 | The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon] |
| 14874 | Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche] |
| 22914 | An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon] |
| 12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
| 12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
| 12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
| 12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge] |
| 12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
| 13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
| 14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington] |
| 14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington] |
| 13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
| 13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
| 14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington] |
| 14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington] |
| 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
| 14275 | Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington] |
| 13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
| 13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
| 14274 | Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington] |
| 14276 | The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington] |
| 14290 | Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington] |
| 13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
| 13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
| 14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington] |
| 14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington] |
| 13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
| 14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington] |
| 14278 | Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington] |
| 14287 | Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington] |
| 1495 | Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius] |
| 405 | The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander] |
| 13222 | The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander] |
| 404 | Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander] |
| 22902 | Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon] |
| 22905 | Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon] |
| 22913 | The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon] |
| 22889 | We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon] |
| 22900 | How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon] |
| 22898 | What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon] |
| 22897 | The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon] |
| 22901 | The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon] |
| 22896 | The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon] |
| 22903 | The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon] |
| 22910 | To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon] |
| 22909 | We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon] |
| 22904 | The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon] |
| 22906 | The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon] |
| 22907 | It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon] |
| 22883 | It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon] |
| 22890 | We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon] |
| 22884 | The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon] |
| 22892 | Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon] |
| 22911 | At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon] |
| 22912 | Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon] |
| 22882 | We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon] |
| 1746 | The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius] |