Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, William of Ockham and Peter Geach

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64 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Why use more things when fewer will do? [William of Ockham]
Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham]
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
If parts change, the whole changes [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham]
Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstractive cognition knows universals abstracted from many singulars [William of Ockham]
If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham]
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
A universal is the result of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing [William of Ockham]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]
The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
Every extended material substance is composed of parts distant from one another [William of Ockham]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]