13 ideas
| 21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
| 6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
| 2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
| 2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
| 6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
| 2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |