Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, W.H. Newton-Smith and Keith DeRose

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3859 We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
3870 The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
3853 For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
3854 Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
3855 Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
3861 Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
3869 More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
3867 De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3872 We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19513 A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19514 Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
19515 We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
19510 In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
19516 Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19511 If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
3857 Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3858 A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
3862 All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
3863 The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
3864 Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
3865 Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
3866 If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
3871 Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]