Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Stewart Cohen and Tyler Burge

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
13479 Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8132 We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17622 We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
16901 The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
9159 You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
16902 Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
16892 Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
9382 Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19558 Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
19561 We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
19563 The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
19560 Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
12893 Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
12896 Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
12894 There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19559 Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
8126 Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
8127 Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
8129 Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
8131 Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3115 Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
14349 If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]