Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Peter Lipton and Gideon Rosen

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86 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]