Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Karl Popper and Noam Chomsky

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22358 Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
18009 Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12177 Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
5451 Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22188 Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
18284 Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
7780 Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
16830 We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
6794 If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
6795 When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
3856 Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
7779 There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3860 Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
12176 Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6649 Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
18007 Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
18006 Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12175 Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
12179 Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]