Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, James Robert Brown and Stephen Yablo

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67 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions should be replaceable by primitives, and should not be creative [Brown,JR]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory says that natural numbers are an actual infinity (to accommodate their powerset) [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Nowadays conditions are only defined on existing sets [Brown,JR]
Naïve set theory assumed that there is a set for every condition [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The 'iterative' view says sets start with the empty set and build up [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A flock of birds is not a set, because a set cannot go anywhere [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
If a proposition is false, then its negation is true [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Axioms are either self-evident, or stipulations, or fallible attempts [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox finds a contradiction in the naming of huge numbers [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is the only place where we are sure we are right [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo]
'There are two apples' can be expressed logically, with no mention of numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / n. Pi
π is a 'transcendental' number, because it is not the solution of an equation [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Mathematics represents the world through structurally similar models. [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
There is no limit to how many ways something can be proved in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Computers played an essential role in proving the four-colour theorem of maps [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Set theory may represent all of mathematics, without actually being mathematics [Brown,JR]
When graphs are defined set-theoretically, that won't cover unlabelled graphs [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
To see a structure in something, we must already have the idea of the structure [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Sets seem basic to mathematics, but they don't suit structuralism [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The irrationality of root-2 was achieved by intellect, not experience [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Empiricists base numbers on objects, Platonists base them on properties [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Does some mathematics depend entirely on notation? [Brown,JR]
The most brilliant formalist was Hilbert [Brown,JR]
For nomalists there are no numbers, only numerals [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo]
Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
There are no constructions for many highly desirable results in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Constructivists say p has no value, if the value depends on Goldbach's Conjecture [Brown,JR]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo]
David's 'Napoleon' is about something concrete and something abstract [Brown,JR]
We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo]
Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo]
'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo]
We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
'Abstract' nowadays means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical [Brown,JR]
The older sense of 'abstract' is where 'redness' or 'group' is abstracted from particulars [Brown,JR]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
A term can have not only a sense and a reference, but also a 'computational role' [Brown,JR]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Given atomism at one end, and a finite universe at the other, there are no physical infinities [Brown,JR]