89 ideas
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
22289 | Dedekind proved definition by recursion, and thus proved the basic laws of arithmetic [Dedekind, by Potter] |
10183 | An infinite set maps into its own proper subset [Dedekind, by Reck/Price] |
22288 | We have the idea of self, and an idea of that idea, and so on, so infinite ideas are available [Dedekind, by Potter] |
10706 | Dedekind originally thought more in terms of mereology than of sets [Dedekind, by Potter] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
9823 | Numbers are free creations of the human mind, to understand differences [Dedekind] |
10090 | Dedekind defined the integers, rationals and reals in terms of just the natural numbers [Dedekind, by George/Velleman] |
7524 | Order, not quantity, is central to defining numbers [Dedekind, by Monk] |
17452 | Ordinals can define cardinals, as the smallest ordinal that maps the set [Dedekind, by Heck] |
14131 | Dedekind's ordinals are just members of any progression whatever [Dedekind, by Russell] |
17611 | We want the essence of continuity, by showing its origin in arithmetic [Dedekind] |
10572 | A cut between rational numbers creates and defines an irrational number [Dedekind] |
14437 | Dedekind's axiom that his Cut must be filled has the advantages of theft over honest toil [Dedekind, by Russell] |
18094 | Dedekind says each cut matches a real; logicists say the cuts are the reals [Dedekind, by Bostock] |
18244 | I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind] |
9824 | In counting we see the human ability to relate, correspond and represent [Dedekind] |
17612 | Arithmetic is just the consequence of counting, which is the successor operation [Dedekind] |
9826 | A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself [Dedekind] |
18087 | If x changes by less and less, it must approach a limit [Dedekind] |
13508 | Dedekind gives a base number which isn't a successor, then adds successors and induction [Dedekind, by Hart,WD] |
18096 | Zero is a member, and all successors; numbers are the intersection of sets satisfying this [Dedekind, by Bostock] |
18841 | Categoricity implies that Dedekind has characterised the numbers, because it has one domain [Rumfitt on Dedekind] |
14130 | Induction is proved in Dedekind, an axiom in Peano; the latter seems simpler and clearer [Dedekind, by Russell] |
8924 | Dedekind originated the structuralist conception of mathematics [Dedekind, by MacBride] |
9153 | Dedekindian abstraction talks of 'positions', where Cantorian abstraction talks of similar objects [Dedekind, by Fine,K] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
9825 | A thing is completely determined by all that can be thought concerning it [Dedekind] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
9189 | Dedekind said numbers were abstracted from systems of objects, leaving only their position [Dedekind, by Dummett] |
9827 | We derive the natural numbers, by neglecting everything of a system except distinctness and order [Dedekind] |
9979 | Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic [Dedekind, by Tait] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |