Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Ian McFetridge and Hugo Grotius

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
7404 Nations are not obliged to help one-another, but are obliged not to harm one another [Grotius, by Tuck]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
7402 Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
21938 Democracy needs respect for individuality, but the 'community of friends' implies strict equality [Grotius]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 7. Freedom to leave
19845 A person is free to renounce their state, as long as it is not a moment of crisis [Grotius, by Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
22133 Grotius and Pufendorf based natural law on real (rather than idealised) humanity [Grotius, by Ford,JD]
7406 A natural right of self-preservation is balanced by a natural law to avoid unnecessary harm [Grotius, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
7403 Grotius ignored elaborate natural law theories, preferring a basic right of self-preservation [Grotius, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
23585 It is permissible in a just cause to capture a place in neutral territory [Grotius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
6892 Moral principles have some validity without a God commanding obedience [Grotius, by Mautner]