Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Howard Robinson and Adam Swift

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51 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H]
Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H]
Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H]
Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H]
If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H]
If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift]
Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift]
Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift]
Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift]
Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift]
A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift]
Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H]