Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, George Berkeley and Sren Kierkegaard

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117 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
I conceived it my task to create difficulties everywhere [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy fails to articulate the continual becoming of existence [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Wherever there is painless contradiction there is also comedy [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Pure truth is for infinite beings only; I prefer endless striving for truth [Kierkegaard]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Subjective truth can only be sustained by repetition [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
I recognise knowledge, but it is the truth by which I can live and die that really matters [Kierkegaard]
Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
The highest truth we can get is uncertainty held fast by an inward passion [Kierkegaard]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley]
For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley]
There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley]
I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley]
There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley]
Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley]
I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
The real subject is ethical, not cognitive [Kierkegaard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
The self is a combination of pairs of attributes: freedom/necessity, infinite/finite, temporal/eternal [Kierkegaard]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
While big metaphysics is complete without ethics, personal philosophy emphasises ethics [Kierkegaard]
Speculative philosophy loses the individual in a vast vision of humanity [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
For me time stands still, and I with it [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety is not a passing mood, but a response to human freedom [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
The ultimate in life is learning to be anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard]
Ultimate knowledge is being anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard]
Anxiety is staring into the yawning abyss of freedom [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
The plebeians bore others; only the nobility bore themselves [Kierkegaard]
Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Reason is just abstractions, so our essence needs a subjective 'leap of faith' [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
There are aesthetic, ethical and religious subjectivity [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
People want to lose themselves in movements and history, instead of being individuals [Kierkegaard]
Becoming what one is is a huge difficulty, because we strongly aspire to be something else [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
What matters is not right choice, but energy, earnestness and pathos in the choosing [Kierkegaard]
Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Life is a repetition when what has been now becomes [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
When we seek our own 'freedom' we are just trying to avoid responsibility [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Kierkegaard prioritises the inward individual, rather than community [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God does not think or exist; God creates, and is eternal [Kierkegaard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley]
There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
God cannot be demonstrated objectively, because God is a subject, only existing inwardly [Kierkegaard]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Pantheism destroys the distinction between good and evil [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard]
The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Without risk there is no faith [Kierkegaard]
Faith is like a dancer's leap, going up to God, but also back to earth [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley]