24 ideas
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |