Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Curt Ducasse and J.L. Austin

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Ordinary language is the beginning of philosophy, but there is much more to it [Austin,JL]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]