Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Cheryl Misak and Scott Shalkowski

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
23277 Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19100 Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
19094 For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
19099 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
19103 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
19105 Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
19108 Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
19101 Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
19106 Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
19096 Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19098 Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
19104 Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
19109 The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
14221 Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14222 Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
14226 We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14225 Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14223 De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
9220 Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14224 Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski]