Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, C.I. Lewis and Robert Hanna

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
11051 Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
11054 Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
11071 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna]
11070 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna]
11088 We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
11059 Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
11089 Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
7791 The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9358 There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
11058 Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna]
11072 Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
11061 Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9357 Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9364 Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
11063 Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
11055 Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11002 Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
11083 A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
11086 Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
11084 Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11085 Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9362 Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
7803 Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9365 We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
11077 Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
11080 Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
11078 Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21500 We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
21501 If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
6556 If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21498 Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
11053 Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
11081 Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
11082 Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
11046 Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna]
11048 Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna]
11067 Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna]
11047 Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna]
11068 One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
11045 Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5828 Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9361 We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]