157 ideas
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
| 9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
| 10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
| 10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
| 21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
| 21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
| 15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
| 15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
| 15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
| 15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
| 15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
| 15130 | If a property is possible, there is something which can have it [Williamson] |
| 15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
| 19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
| 19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
| 21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
| 21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
| 19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
| 21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
| 21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
| 10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
| 10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
| 10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
| 10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
| 18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
| 15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
| 21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
| 21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
| 10632 | The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright] |
| 9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
| 19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
| 19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
| 10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
| 10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
| 10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
| 10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
| 10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
| 19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
| 21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
| 21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
| 21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
| 21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
| 21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
| 21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
| 9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
| 21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
| 21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
| 21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
| 21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
| 21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
| 21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
| 21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
| 21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
| 21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
| 21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
| 10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
| 10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
| 21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
| 10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
| 10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
| 10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
| 10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
| 10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
| 10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| 21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
| 21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
| 10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
| 10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
| 14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
| 15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
| 19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
| 8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
| 15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
| 15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
| 19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
| 19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
| 15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
| 15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
| 15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
| 19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
| 19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
| 14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
| 14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
| 14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
| 12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
| 12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
| 19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| 19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
| 19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
| 19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
| 21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
| 19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
| 15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
| 18925 | If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron] |
| 21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
| 4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
| 19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
| 21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
| 18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |