Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Bernard Linsky and Daniel Statman

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
18776 Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
18774 Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
7096 We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
7098 There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
7099 With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
7100 Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
7102 Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
7095 Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
7094 Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
7104 The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
7093 Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
7103 Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]