Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, B Hale / C Wright and Laozi (Lao Tzu)

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / g. Desires
There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]