39 ideas
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
| 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| 22673 | Wherever there is a small community, the association of the people is natural [Tocqueville] |
| 22676 | The people are just individuals, and only present themselves as united to foreigners [Tocqueville] |
| 22679 | Vast empires are bad for well-being and freedom, though they may promote glory [Tocqueville] |
| 22680 | People would be much happier and freer in small nations [Tocqueville] |
| 22675 | In American judges rule according to the Constitution, not the law [Tocqueville] |
| 22677 | A monarchical family is always deeply concerned with the interests of the state [Tocqueville] |
| 22683 | Despots like to see their own regulations ignored, by themselves and their agents [Tocqueville] |
| 22669 | Aristocracy is constituted by inherited landed property [Tocqueville] |
| 22674 | In Europe it is thought that local government is best handled centrally [Tocqueville] |
| 22678 | An election, and its lead up time, are always a national crisis [Tocqueville] |
| 22682 | Universal suffrage is no guarantee of wise choices [Tocqueville] |
| 22670 | Slavery undermines the morals and energy of a society [Tocqueville] |
| 22681 | The liberty of the press is more valuable for what it prevents than what it promotes [Tocqueville] |
| 22672 | It is admirable to elevate the humble to the level of the great, but the opposite is depraved [Tocqueville] |
| 22671 | Equality can only be established by equal rights for all (or no rights for anyone) [Tocqueville] |