Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Alex Oliver and Robert Merrihew Adams

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
10468 A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
10471 Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
10749 Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
10750 Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10747 Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
10748 Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10721 If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
10719 There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
10716 There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
10720 We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10714 The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
10715 There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10739 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
10738 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
10740 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
10741 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
10742 Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10472 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10724 Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
10730 If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
7963 Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
7962 Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
10727 Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
10722 Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10744 Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14508 A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
14511 There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
16463 Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
10726 Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
10725 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
12031 Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12034 If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
14510 Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
16455 Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
10745 Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14507 Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11964 Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16451 Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
11901 Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
14512 Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
10746 Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
12032 Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]