Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Alan Musgrave and Simon Blackburn

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

19 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10061 The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave]
10065 Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10049 Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave]
10050 A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
10058 No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
10062 Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave]
10063 Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
19284 Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14629 If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
14529 If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6451 Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
2866 A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10060 Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
23996 Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
11911 Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2864 The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2865 Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
23223 The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn]