Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Alcmaeon, Ian Rumfitt and Martin Heidegger

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105 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger]
Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Perhaps the aim of philosophy is to abolish sham problems [Heidegger]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo]
Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt]
Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt]
A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt]
Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt]
If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May]
For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray]
Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger]
Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger]
In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger]
'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger]
The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger]
I say the manifestation of Being needs humans, and humans only exist as reflected in Being [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt]
Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Alcmaeon was the first to say the brain is central to thinking [Alcmaeon, by Staden, von]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
My active existence is defined by being able to say 'I can' [Heidegger]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Certainty that I will die is more basic to my existence than the Cogito [Heidegger]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt]
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger]
Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Culture is now dominated by boredom, so universal it is unnoticed [Heidegger, by Aho]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley]
Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Soul must be immortal, since it continually moves, like the heavens [Alcmaeon, by Aristotle]