Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, Susan A. Gelman and David Hilbert

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67 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle [Hilbert]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert]
Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert]
We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert]
Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry [Hilbert, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert]
We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert]
Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects [Hilbert, by Chihara]
Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid [Hilbert, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers [Hilbert, by Field,H]
The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert]
Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman]
Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter]
The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman]
Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman]
Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman]
Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman]
Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman]
Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman]
Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman]
We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman]
Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert]
Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]